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MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Robert A. Pascal*
REESTABLISHMENT OF COMMUNITY OF GAINS AFTER RECONCILIATION
Article 155 of the Civil Code permits spouses who become recon-
ciled after a separation from bed and board to reestablish the com-
munity of gains "as of the date of the filing of the suit for separation
. . . without prejudice to rights validly acquired . . . hetween . . .
the judgment and recordation of the act of reconciliation." In
Cockern v. Cockern' the act reestablishing the community of gains
stated it did so as of the date of the filing of the suit for separation
but then proceeded to except from its provisions all assets acquired
by each spouse between that date and the execution of the reesta-
blishing act. What the spouses had attempted to do, as the lower
court seemed to recognize without noting its invalidity, was to reesta-
blish the community as of the date of the reestablishing act rather
than as of the date of the filing of suit for separation.
The court of appeal nonetheless honored the exception. It is sub-
mitted that the decision is most certainly in error. Article 155 permits
reestablishment of the community only as of the day of the effective
date of the separation of goods and effects invoked by the judgment
of separation from bed and board. This implies that all assets and
liabilities which would have entered the community of gains had it
not been terminated must then be regarded as such between the
spouses. The rule not tolerating any other kind of reestablishment of
the community of gains must be regarded as one of public order, not
subject to being contracted against by the spouses. The provision that
the reestablishment of the community shall not prejudice rights ac-
quired in the interim can be construed only as referring to the rights
of third persons, not those of the spouses, for otherwise this clause
would be inconsistent with that requiring the reestablishment to be
as of the date of the filing of suit for separation.
The public order character of the rule of article 155 as construed
above is easy to perceive. By article 2329 of the Civil Code a matri-
monial regime may not be altered by any convention once the spouses
have married. The rule of article 155 is in an exception in favor of
those who find their separation from bed and board a mistake and
who wish to resume in every way the relationship which they had
before the separation. Any other construction would open the door to
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 270 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
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spouses obtaining separation judgments followed by "reestablish-
ments" which were only partial, and therefore contrary to the rule of
article 2329.
WIFE's ACCEPTANCE WITH BENEFIT OF INVENTORY: PARTITION OF
COMMUNITY
Misunderstandings of the rules on the partition of the com-
munity of gains and of the effects of the wife's acceptance of the
community with benefit of inventory are evident in both the conten-
tions of the parties and the reasoning of the court in Edwards v.
Edwards.2 The writer can appreciate the misunderstandings of the
court, for he himself shared one of them until at least four years ago.'
They are misunderstandings, however, and the correct construction
of the law must be outlined here.
A divorced husband petitioned for a partition of the "community
estate" by licitation. The divorced wife answered denying the hus-
band's right to a partition, accepting the community with benefit of
inventory, and reconvened for an administration of the "community
estate," praying she be appointed administratrix thereof. The lower
and appellate courts both granted the husband judgment ordering a
partition by licitation and denying the wife's request for an adminis-
tration. The proper solution would have been (1) to partition the
community assets in kind, if possible, and (2) to appoint someone,
possibly the wife, administrator of the assets received by the wife in
the partition so that her half of the community debts might be paid
with those assets or their proceeds, as far as they would go, and the
surplus assets, if any, distributed to her. These points will appear
from the exposition below.
On dissolution of the community of gains each spouse becomes
entitled, as a matter of law, to one-half of the assets4 and obliged, vis-
a-vis each other, to pay half the outstanding community debts.' The
wife, nevertheless, has three alternatives open to her, and the hus-
band's rights and liabilities ultimately depend on her election. The
wife may renounce the community, absolving herself of all responsi-
bility for the community debts, but also giving up her right to de-
mand one-half of the community assetsA In that event the husband
2. 268 So. 2d 686 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
3. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term-
Matrimonial Regimes, 30 LA. L. REV. 219, 223 (1969).
4. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2406.
5. Id. art. 2409.
6. Id. arts. 2410, 2411.
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becomes owner of all community assets and solely liable, vis-a-vis the
wife, for all community debts.7 There is then no occasion for a parti-
tion. Next, the wife may accept the community simply (or "uncondi-
tionally"), thereby retaining her right to one-half of the community
assets, remaining obliged vis-a-vis her husband to pay one-half the
community debts,' and assuming personal liability toward his com-
munity creditors for one-half their credits.' From the moment of the
wife's simple acceptance of the community either spouse may de-
mand a partition,10 which, under the normal rules of partition, must
be in kind if this kind of partition is possible under the circumstances
and either spouse demands it. (It is to be noted that the Civil Code
states that each spouse is entitled to one-half of the community as-
sets, not that each spouse has a one-half interest in the community
assets.) Finally the wife, since 1882, has had the right to accept the
community of gains with benefit of inventory." This acceptance is a
true definitive retention of her right to one-half the community as-
sets; it is also a true retention of her liability for one-half the com-
munity debts vis-a-vis her husband and a true assumption of liability
toward her husband's community creditors for one-half their credits,
but only insofar as, in each instance, those assets will be sufficient
to pay that liability.'" Because the wife accepting with benefit of
inventory retains definitively full right to one-half of the community
assets, either spouse is then entitled to a partition so that it may be
ascertained which of those assets will fall to the lot of each.'" Because
the wife accepting with benefit of inventory is obliged to pay one-half
the community debts out of her share of the community assets only,
the law wisely requires a payment of these liabilities in an adminis-
tration of her share of those assets; but it is only her share of the
community assets, determined and fixed in a previous partition,
which is ever subject to administration pursuant to the wife's accept-
ance of the community with benefit of inventory. 4
7. This inference is from Louisiana Civil Code articles 2406-2411 and the fact that
a debt becomes a community debt only by first becoming a debt of the husband, who
is head and master of the community under Louisiana Civil Code article 2404.
8. By accepting, the wife retains the rights given her by Louisiana Civil Code
articles 2406 and 2409.
9. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2409.
10. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2409 presupposes this.
11. LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950) (originally La. Acts 1882, No. 4). This legislation gives
the wife the same right the "beneficiary heir" has to accept his share of a succession
with benefit of inventory, and hence constitutes a reference to those articles.
12. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1032 (by analogy required by LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950)).
13. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1047 (by analogy required by LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950)).
14. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1058 (construed with article 1047, all by analogy required
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OBLIGATIONS ON THE WIFE'S CONTRACTS
Unpaid creditors of the wife will never cease trying to have the
judiciary declare her husband liable for obligations contracted by her.
The 1972-1973 decisions have their share of such cases, and as in
former years, the opinions are less than fully satisfactory. In General
Tire Service v. Nash,'5 for example, a wife living with her husband
under the community of gains, using her name only, purchased tires,
for an automobile registered in her name only, without the knowledge
of the husband. The unpaid seller sued the husband. The court of
appeal remanded the case for lack of sufficient evidence to permit
disposition on appeal, but declared that the husband could be held
liable if the tires could be found to constitute "necessaries" and the
husband could be shown to have failed to supply them, citing article
1786 of the Civil Code. Certainly the construction and application of
article 1786 given and made in General Tire are in error. Article 1786
is in a section of the Civil Code treating of the capacity of persons to
obligate themselves, and thus with the capacity of the married
woman to obligate herself for "necessaries" when the husband fails
to supply them to her and the family. Until the married women's
emancipation legislation the article applied to married women of all
ages. Today it applies only to married women under eighteen years
of age.'" The article was never intended to mean that the married
woman could obligate her husband for such necessaries, though in-
deed she might do so as his negotiorum gestor in the circumstances
mentioned in article 1786 and in others, as long as the conditions of
article 2299 are met. The erroneous application of article 1786 is of
long standing; but error never generates its own right to be repeated.
There are, of course, other bases on which the husband in
General Tire might be found liable, the evidence being available.
Whether the automobile for which the tires were purchased was a
community asset or the separate asset of the wife, for example, if it
was being used for family purposes and not merely the separate pur-
poses of the wife, the cost of tires for it might well be considered a
normal "expense of the marriage," even if not a "necessary expense";
or, even if the automobile was the separate asset of the wife, if the
wife had not recorded her intent to administer her assets and keep
their fruits, the husband would be entitled to its administration and
by LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950)).
15. 273 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
16. LA. R.S. 9:101, 104 (1950). See also the remarks of the writer in The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term -Matrimonial Regimes, 28 LA.
L. REv. 327, 332 (1968).
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its fruits'" and therefore obliged vis-a-vis his wife for its mainte-
nance." In either case, the evidence might show that the seller had
understood the wife to be acting in exercise of the Louisiana hus-
band's customarily presumed tacit mandate to his wife to obligate
him for "expenses of the family," or, at the very least, that the hus-
band had been enriched and the seller correspondingly impoverished
without legal cause as to the husband.'"
Miscellaneous other related decisions may be mentioned. In
American National Bank v. Rathburn,20 a wife living geparate and
apart from her husband had found and used a credit card, issued to
her husband without his request, but not destroyed or returned by
him, for her own purposes. The court of appeal correctly concluded
the husband had not authorized the use of the credit card and could
not be liable on that basis. Whether the court was correct in conclud-
ing one is not liable for the use of a credit card by one whom third
persons might reasonably believe he has authorized is a matter not
commented on here. In National Bank v. Formea,21 a wife living
separate and apart drew N.S.F. checks on an account standing in the
joint names of husband and wife. The payee, the plaintiff bank, sued
the husband. The court of appeal correctly gave judgment to the
husband. Instead of stating the husband had not authorized the wife,
however, the court should have noted simply that a party to a joint
account does not obligate the other by drawing a check thereon. Each
party may draw on the account, but neither obligates the other by
his act in his own name. It may be noted, too, in reference to the
above cases, that the tacit mandate, which husbands are presumed
to have given their wives to contract in their names for ordinary
expenses of the family, cannot reasonably be considered to continue
once the spouses have begun to live separate and apart. Finally, in
Friendly Loans, Inc. v. Robinson,22 the court of appeal correctly
judged the wife personally liable to third persons on a note signed by
her. Indeed, since the married women's emancipation legislation
23
17. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2386.
18. See the remarks of the writer in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1966-1967 Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 28 LA. L. REV. 327, 332 (1968). For a
discussion in a student comment by George Bilbe, (now Assistant Professor of Law,
Loyola University) see Comment, 30 LA. L. REv. 441, 446, 456 (1970).
19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2294 (construed in the light of the principle of enrichment
without legal cause underlying various rules in the Civil Code and especially articles
2301-14 on the "payment of the thing not due").
20. 264 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
21. 272 So. 2d 411 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
22. 268 So. 2d 710 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
23. LA. R.S. 9:101-104 (1950).
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there has been no excuse for not holding any married woman over
eighteen years of age and not interdicted for any act in her name,
even if the act was also or even primarily that of her husband.
WIFE'S CONTRACTS WITH HUSBAND
In Carney v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,24 the court
repeated the often committed error of construing article 1790 of the
Civil Code to forbid the husband and wife to contract with each other
except where authorized to do so by the legislation. This is the very
converse of the construction of the article which its reading in full
would indicate to be reasonable, for its first broad statement is lim-
ited by later phraseology that "These [special incapacities] take
place only in the cases specially provided for by law under different
titles of this Code." 5 The particular issue was whether the spouses
might be deemed to have formed a partnership, and the court was
correct in stating spouses are unable to do so under our law. But the
basis is not article 1790, but article 2329, which forbids the conven-
tional alteration of matrimonial regimes after marriage, for any part-
nership entered into by husband and wife after marriage would alter
their matrimonial regime.
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ERRONEOUS NOTION THAT THE WIFE "OWNS"
ONE-HALF OF THE COMMUNITY OF GAINS26
Years ago Phillips v. Phillips27 declared the wife to have a
"vested interest" in one-half the community of gains at every mo-
ment of its existence. This was a strange conclusion indeed; for when
one considers the right of the wife to renounce the community at its
dissolution, with all that implies for the avoidance of community
24. 277 So. 2d 175 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
25. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1790: "Besides the general incapacity which persons of
certain descriptions are under, there are others applicable only to certain contracts,
either in relation to the parties, such as a husband and a wife, tutor and ward, whose
contracts with each other are forbidden; or in relation to the subject of the contract,
such as purchases, by the administrator, of any part of the estate which is committed
to his charge, and the incapacity of the wife, even with the assent of the husband, to
alienate her dotal property, or to become security for his debts. These take place only
in the cases especially provided by law, under different titles of this Code."
26. This portion of the discussion of Matrimonial Regimes decisions was written
and edited before the decision in Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., - So. 2d - (La.
1973). The decision not only reversed the court of appeal but also overruled Green and,
in part at least, Phillipps and Fazzio.
27. 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926).
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liabilities,"' one would be compelled to say something that is very
strange in law: that one, by the sheer act of his (or her) will, might
avoid his (or her) obligations. 9 This is not to say the wife does not
have a present right as to the community of gains; but it is only a
right to elect to accept it, renounce it, or accept it with benefit of
inventory as of the moment of its dissolution. This is an important
and valuable right indeed, and it is one which the law has sought to
protect with increasing vigor; but it falls very short of a present inter-
est in the community of gains. Nor is this to say the husband is owner
of the community during its existence. The Civil Code describes him
as its "head and master, 33 as its steward, as it were, but no more;
and whereas this stewardship has caused the community to be con-
sidered a part of his patrimony, so far as third persons are con-
cerned,3' he is not truly owner vis-a-vis the wife.
Erroneous decisions often have a cancerous growth, for lawyers
have a way of seizing on anything which they might extend logically
to achieve the ends their clients desire. Thus we have had such deci-
sions as Fazzio v. Krieger, 32 in which the husband's alimentary obli-
gee was declared able to execute his judgment against the husband's
half of the community assets only, and U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty
Insurance Co. v. Green,33 in which the husband's antenuptual credi-
tors were not permitted to execute against the community assets at
all because of the alleged one-half interest of the wife therein. Each
of these last mentioned decisions was followed in the last term, for
judges are reluctant to depart from previous decisions of judges above
them. Fazzio was followed in this term by White v. Klein34 and Green
by Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc.35 But there were other erroneous
decisions, before and during the last term, which may be considered
the progency of Phillips. Gebbia v. City of New Orleansm allowed a
wife to sue to enforce a community right on the theory she was part
owner of the community and therefore with sufficient interest to sue
if the defendant did not take exception timely. This decision may be
28. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2410.
29. Louisiana Civil Code article 3182 declares everyone obliged to discharge his
obligations from all his assets and does not provide for any exception.
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404.
31. The traditional view was expressed in Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann. 396
(1858) and other decisions.
32. 226 La. 511, 76 So. 2d 713 (1954).
33. 252 La. 227, 210 So. 2d 328 (1968).
34. 263 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
35. 268 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
36. 249 La. 409, 187 So. 2d 423 (1966).
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considered the precursor of the 1970 amendment to article 686 of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, giving the wife the exclusive right
to sue for her earnings, though community assets, the most serious
inroad ever on the husband's position as head and master of the
community of gains. Now, in the last term, arguments appear to have
been made which must have been inspired by Phillips and its off-
shoots. Thus in Fulmer v. Harper37 there was an attempt to satisfy
the debts of a bankrupt wife from the effects of the community of
gains, and in Holmes v. Holmes"4 a wife attempted to exercise her
husband's claim to workmen's compensation benefits on the ground
it was a community asset in which she had an interest. Fortunately
these contentions were not honored. Such claims, however, will be
made until Phillips, Fazzio, Green, Gebbia, and other cases of the
kind are overruled.
37. 265 So. 2d 355 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
38. 270 So. 2d 578 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
